If N. Cocchiarella’s recent discussion of Frege’s function-correlate is correct, we have reason to assimilate Frege’s ontology to the Avicennian-Scotistic tripartite ontology of individuals, universals, and common natures in themselves. Further, to the extent that Scotus’ ontology is similar to Frege’s ontology, we may have indirect evidence concerning how Bergmann would think about such an interpretation of Scotus’ haecceitas ontology. I want to show that current treatments of individuation can be seriously challenged by the possible return of the common nature. My strategy will be as follows. In Sect.1, I shall discuss Cocchiarella’s thesis regarding Frege’s function-correlates. In Sect.2, by using Cocchiarella’s thesis, I shall try to compare Frege’s ontology with the Avicennian-Scotistic tripartite ontology. Some of the similarities and differences between these two ontologies will become clearer in the process. In Sect.3, I shall examine Bergmann’s interpretation of Frege’s ontology. After having drawn attention to how Bergmann criticizes Frege’s introduction of concept-correlates and value-ranges, we may understand, in Sect.4, how Bergmann would view Frege’s and Scotus’ tripartite ontologies. Hopefully the peculiarity of Bergmann’s theory of universals and his bare particular theory of individuation will stand out clearly against the background of Frege’s and Scotus’ ontologies.