The effects of third-party transfers in sequential anchored bargaining

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We analyze a bargaining game where an anchor player bargains sequentially with n non-anchor players over the division of a pie in the presence of third-party transfers and show that there exists a unique perfect equilibrium. A lump-sum transfer is jointly shared by all players, while a transfer proportional to a player's share affects only the party that has to make that transfer. When lump-sum transfers are zero, the anchor player and each non-anchor player bargain as if there is no further bargaining. It turns out that the anchor player and the last non-anchor player are in the most disadvantageous position with our bargaining protocol.
Publisher
SPRINGER HEIDELBERG
Issue Date
2019-03
Language
English
Article Type
Article
Citation

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, v.48, no.1, pp.143 - 155

ISSN
0020-7276
DOI
10.1007/s00182-018-00657-x
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/262588
Appears in Collection
MG-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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