Voluntary disclosures as a form of impression management to reduce evaluative uncertainty during M&A

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This study develops and tests a set of hypotheses on how to manage investors’ evaluative uncertainty during M&A through a specific form of impression management, namely, interim news events. We suggest that voluntary disclosures are key in influencing investors’ reactions during M&A. Empirical support for our theoretical arguments is shown in a sample of 36,376 deals and 163,023 associated interim news events carried out by NYSE and NSDQ listed organizations over 10 years. Our research contributes to literature on voluntary disclosures, impression management, and managing M&A.
Publisher
Academy of Management
Issue Date
2014-01
Language
English
Citation

Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings, v.2014, no.1, pp.15879

ISSN
0065-0668
DOI
10.5465/ambpp.2014.1
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/250159
Appears in Collection
RIMS Journal Papers
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