Price competition between random and assortive matchmakers

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We study price competition between heterogeneous matchmakers in a two-sided matching market. It is well known that when two passive matchmakers who provide random matching services compete with entrance fees, there exists no pure-strategy equilibrium. We show that when a passive matchmaker and an active matchmaker, who provides an assortive matching service, compete with entrance fees, there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium. We also provide welfare comparison between the duopoly and a monopoly operating both the passive and active networks.
Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Issue Date
2017-11
Language
English
Article Type
Article
Keywords

BARGAINING MODEL; REAL-ESTATE; SEARCH; MARKETS; STABILITY; MARRIAGE

Citation

MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, v.90, pp.63 - 72

ISSN
0165-4896
DOI
10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.06.003
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/228449
Appears in Collection
MG-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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