DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Hwang, Sung-Ha | ko |
dc.contributor.author | Newton, Jonathan | ko |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-10-23T02:37:24Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-10-23T02:37:24Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2017-10-18 | - |
dc.date.created | 2017-10-18 | - |
dc.date.created | 2017-10-18 | - |
dc.date.created | 2017-10-18 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017-10 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | ECONOMIC THEORY, v.64, no.3, pp.589 - 604 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0938-2259 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/226606 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper considers populations of agents whose behavior when playing some underlying game is governed by perturbed best (or better) response dynamics with perturbation probabilities that depend log-linearly on payoffs, a class that includes the logit choice rule. A convention is a state at which every agent plays a strategy that corresponds to the same strict Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. For coordination games with zero payoff off-diagonal, it is shown that the difficulty of leaving the basin of attraction of a convention can be well approximated by only considering paths of transitions on which an identical perturbation repeatedly affects one of the populations. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.publisher | SPRINGER | - |
dc.title | Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000412755600007 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-84976865516 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.citation.volume | 64 | - |
dc.citation.issue | 3 | - |
dc.citation.beginningpage | 589 | - |
dc.citation.endingpage | 604 | - |
dc.citation.publicationname | ECONOMIC THEORY | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s00199-016-0988-x | - |
dc.contributor.localauthor | Hwang, Sung-Ha | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Newton, Jonathan | - |
dc.description.isOpenAccess | N | - |
dc.type.journalArticle | Article | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Evolution | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Coordination | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Logit | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Payoff dependence | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | BETTER-REPLY DYNAMICS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | STOCHASTIC STABILITY | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | BARGAINING PROBLEM | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | CONVENTIONS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | EQUILIBRIUM | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | EVOLUTION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | MARRIAGE | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | MARKET | - |
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