What if Haecceity is not a Property?

In some sense, both ontological and epistemological problems related to individuation have been the focal issues in the philosophy of mathematics ever since Frege. However, such an interest becomes manifest in the rise of structuralism as one of the most promising positions in recent philosophy of mathematics. The most recent controversy between Keranen and Shapiro seems to be the culmination of this phenomenon. Rather than taking sides, in this paper, I propose to critically examine some common assumptions shared by both parties. In particular, I shall focus on their assumptions on (1) haecceity as an individual essence, (2) haecceity as a property, (3) the classification of properties, and thereby (4) the search for the principle of individuation in terms of properties. I shall argue that all these assumptions are mistaken and ungrounded from Scotus' point of view. Further, I will fathom what consequences would follow, if we reject each of these assumptions.
Publisher
SPRINGER
Issue Date
2016-08
Language
ENG
Keywords

IDENTITY; STRUCTURALISM

Citation

FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE, v.21, no.3, pp.511 - 526

ISSN
1233-1821
DOI
10.1007/s10699-015-9429-8
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/212907
Appears in Collection
HSS-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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