A new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution: fictitious play

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We provide a new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution, using fictitious play. Based on the finding that the Nash demand game has the fictitious play property and that almost every fictitious play process and its associated belief path converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the Nash demand game (In, 2014), we present two initial demand games which exactly and approximately implement the Nash bargaining solution.
Publisher
The Stony Brook Center for Game Theory
Issue Date
2015-07-21
Language
English
Citation

26th International Conference on Game Theory

URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/210761
Appears in Collection
MT-Conference Papers(학술회의논문)
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