The composition of top management with general counsel and voluntary information disclosure

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We examine whether the composition of top management with General Counsel (GC) affects properties of management earnings forecasts disclosures. After controlling for corporate governance and litigation risk, we find that firms with a GC in top management are more likely to issue forecasts, particularly bad news forecasts, than other firms. Further, their forecasts are less optimistic and more accurate than those issued by others. Consistently, the stock price reaction to their forecast news is stronger. These effects are more pronounced when the GC's managerial status is higher. Overall, our results suggest that GCs play an important role in corporate disclosures. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Issue Date
2012-08
Language
English
Article Type
Article
Citation

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING ECONOMICS, v.54, no.1, pp.19 - 41

ISSN
0165-4101
DOI
10.1016/j.jacceco.2012.04.001
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/101742
Appears in Collection
MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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